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The calls for Germany, specifically Chancellor Angela Merkel, to 
withdraw its support for Nord Stream 2 have increased following 
the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny with the 
nerve agent Novichok. Merkel’s stance had so far been to ‘decouple’ 
both issues, insisting that Nord Stream 2 is ‘just a commercial 
project’ , but more recently, she indicated that she does not rule 
out actions against Nord Stream 2.  However, Navalny’s poisoning 
is unlikely to result in Merkel dropping her support for the project 
as the costs to abandon the project outweigh the benefits for 
Germany and herself.
The controversial Nord Stream 2 project has dominated much of the 
European Union’s (EU) energy discussions since it was first announced 
in June 2015. This 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) gas project runs from 
Russia to Germany, along the bottom of the Baltic Sea through the 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Nord 
Stream 2 is preceded by its sister pipeline Nord Stream 1, which became 
operational in 2012 and also has a capacity of 55 bcm.
The Nord Stream 2 project is expected to reroute some of the gas from 
the Ukraine transit route. Opponents of the project fear that the pipeline 
could have severe implications for the sovereignty of Ukraine, 
considering the annexation of the Crimea in 2014. 
Additionally, the project could negatively impact (European) energy 
security and make Germany, in the words of President Donald Trump, 
‘captive to Russia’.  Therefore, the project has been opposed by 
Washington, Kyiv, Warsaw and Brussels. The construction of the 
pipeline is nearly finished, with a mere 160 km of the 1230 km long 
pipeline still needing to be constructed. 
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Nord Stream 2 crises
Germany has demonstrated unwavering support for the project in 
previous Nord Stream 2 crises. The Gazprom project – with investments 
from Shell, Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung (OMV), ENGIE, Uniper 
and Wintershall – has already managed to survive four major hurdles 
that threatened its construction. 
The first hurdle was the objection by the Polish regulator authorities 
(UOKiK) in 2015. The UOKiK launched an antitrust investigation against 
the project, because of its original organisational structure, with 
Gazprom and the European companies as shareholders.
As a result, the Nord Stream 2 consortium changed its organisational 
structure, making the European companies investors rather than 
shareholders, thus leaving Gazprom as the sole owner of the project. 
This way, the first obstacle was overcome. 
US sanctions have brought the construction 
works to a complete standstill
The second obstacle came in the guise of EU regulation. In 2016, the 
European Commission claimed that Nord Stream 2 did not comply with 
EU internal market law, notably the requirement of ‘ownership 
unbundling’ (that no single company can be the owner of both the 
pipeline and the transmitted gas) as stipulated in the Gas Directive.
However, the argument that the Gas Directive also applied to 
international pipelines rested on shaky grounds, and was even 
challenged by the European Commission’s own Legal Service. [4]
In response, the European Commission changed tack and proposed 
amendments to the Gas Directive, which, after a long battle in the 
European Council, were eventually accepted. These amendments forced 
Nord Stream 2 to comply with EU regulation, limiting the capacity that 
Gazprom could book and thus making the project less profitable.  
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Following the amendments, the Nord Stream 2 consortium filed a case 
against the European Commission through the Energy Charter Treaty to 
have the amendments cancelled on discriminatory grounds. This case is 
still pending. 
A third hurdle was Denmark dragging its feet to issue a construction 
permit for Nord Stream 2 through its EEZ. After the construction of Nord 
Stream 1, Denmark added a security assessment as a requirement for a 
construction permit. This slowed down the permitting process for Nord 
Stream 2. Eventually, the Danish permit was issued in October 2019. 
But soon a fourth obstacle arose, and this time it came from across the 
Atlantic. In late 2019, the United States (US) imposed sanctions targeting 
Allseas, the pipe-laying company working on Nord Stream 2, which 
immediately ceased all activities on the project. The US had long 
objected to the project because of its geopolitical implications for 
Ukraine, the threat to European energy security and US national 
security. The US had hoped the sanctions would result in the 
cancellation of the project.
German support for the project infuriated 
some Eastern European and Baltic countries, 
who oppose the project because of its security 
implications for Europe
US sanctions, solely targeting pipe-laying vessels, have brought the 
construction works to a complete standstill. President Vladimir Putin, 
however, vowed to continue the project using Russian pipe-laying 
vessels. 
This prompted US Congress to propose additional sanctions against the 
project in another attempt to cancel it. These new sanctions, targeting 
certification and insurance of the pipeline, are currently being handled 
in the US Congress and have been added to a “must-pass” bill. The 
consequences of these sanctions, if imposed, would be detrimental to the 
project. 
German support
Despite external pressure, German support for the project has been 
strong since its announcement. The German government has 
maintained from the outset that the project was a ‘commercial’ 
endeavour, a questionable assumption at best given the clear 
geopolitical aspects of the project.  
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In April 2018, Merkel stated that Nord Stream 2 would only become 
operational if the Ukraine transit route was preserved.  This already 
represented a minor change in Germany’s previous stance that the 
project was solely commercial.
However, since this statement, German support for the project gas 
remained solid. Germany spearheaded the opposition to the Gas 
Directive amendments in the European Council in 2018 and 2019. This 
German support for the project infuriated some Eastern European and 
Baltic countries, who oppose the project because of its security 
implications for Europe. As a consequence, German relations with these 
countries have become more strained. 
US opposition to the project and questions about Germany’s role in the 
project were disparaged by German claims that the US attempted to sell 
its liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe.  US-German relations had 
already come under pressure, following President Trump’s comments 
on Germany’s NATO spending. 
Even within Merkel’s own party there has 
been opposition to the project
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Conversely, following the 2019 amendments to the Gas Directive, the 
German gas regulator denied the project’s consortium requests for 
exemptions to EU rules. This marks a break with the accommodating 
approach Germany took to the case of Nord Stream 1 and the OPAL 
(Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung) gas pipeline, which connects to 
Nord Stream 1. 
The denial meant that Nord Stream 2 needs to adhere to the rules of the 
Gas Directive and the pipeline cannot operate at full capacity. Despite 
this, Merkel has continued to support Nord Stream 2.
In Germany
Within Germany, there is also criticism of the government’s support for 
the project since its announcement. For example Reinhard Bütikofer, a 
member of the Greens in the European Parliament, has long voiced his 
concern for the geopolitical implications of the project and supported 
the calls to stop it. 
Current Nord Stream 2 board member Gerhard Schröder during a party conference in 
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Even within Merkel’s own party, the Christlich Demokratische Union
(CDU), there has been opposition to the project. For example, CDU’s 
Norbert Röttgen already asked for the cancellation of Nord Stream 2 in 
2016.  Also, Merkel’s CDU successor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, 
has indicated that the project is not ‘close to her heart’ and that she 
would merely inherit the pipeline. 
In 2020, calls to cancel German support for the project became stronger 
following the April 2020 conclusions that the Kremlin was responsible 
for a 2015 hack on the Bundestag’s computer system  and Russian 
non-cooperation in an assassination investigation of a former Chechen 
rebel in Berlin.
However, none of these issues proved sufficient to stop German support, 
as Merkel said she is ‘striving every day for a better relationship with 
Russia’.
The abandonment of the project could result 
in the SPD to drop its support for the coalition 
and force new elections
Moreover, the future political costs for Merkel to stop supporting Nord 
Stream 2 are marginal. In 2018, Merkel announced her intention to not 
seek re-election in 2021. This means her unpopular stance on Nord 
Stream 2 would not complicate her political career in the future. 
In fact, the current political costs of abandoning the project are higher. 
The German governing coalition party Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD) has continued to support the project. 
The SPD is the former party of Merkel’s predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, 
who now sits on the board of the Nord Stream 2 consortium. The SPD’s 
spokesperson for foreign affairs, Nils Schmid, has therefore attempted to 
deflect attention from Nord Stream 2.
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The abandonment of the project could result in the SPD to drop its 
support for the coalition and force new elections. Next to this, 
companies involved in the project have continued to support its 
construction.
Navalny 
The poisoning of Navalny has resuscitated the debate on Nord Stream 2 
in Germany and beyond. Initially, Merkel asked to ‘decouple’ the 
poisoning of Navalny from Nord Stream 2, but her position slightly 
changed in the following days.  The conclusion that he was poisoned 
using a Soviet-era nerve agent, resulted in Merkel stating that Russia 
needed to explain itself before countermeasures were taken. Merkel has 
not ruled out targeting Nord Stream 2. 
Decoupling Russian malign acts abroad has been a German favoured 
strategy in the case of Nord Stream 2. Despite a long list of questionable 
Russian acts in other sovereign states, the project has managed to stay in 
Germany’s grace.
Cancellation of this project would incur costs 
for German and other European investors
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Some of these acts even predate the project and include Russian support 
for rebels in eastern Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the poisoning of 
the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, 
involvement in the Brexit elections and the US presidential elections, its 
involvement in the Syrian conflict and the aforementioned acts on 
German territory. However, the act of poisoning Navalny is different 
from the previous acts as it happened in Russia.
Costs
Nord Stream 2 is nearing completion, and is expected to be operational 
by the end of 2020 or early 2021. The final 160 km of Nord Stream 2 
needs to be built in the Danish EEZ. The 9.5 billion euros investment of 
the European companies and Gazprom has already been spent. 
Cancellation of the project due to Germany’s position could therefore 
result in Gazprom demanding compensation. Whether such claims 
would bear success is debated among lawyers. 
Alexei Navalny during a protest in February 2020. The protest was held in memory of the 
killed opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. © Flickr / Michał Siergiejevicz
Next to this, German companies would lose their investment, something 
that Uniper had already warned its shareholders about after the US 
sanctions.  Consequently, cancellation of this project would incur 
costs for German and other European investors.
Message in a pipeline
Germany dropping support for the pipeline would send a message to 
Putin. Natural gas is one of the main sources of income for Russia and 
the project, serving as a large infrastructure development that will assist 
in circumventing Ukraine, holds a symbolic meaning because of the 
many obstacles it has overcome. By losing German support, after which 
the project will be cancelled, this objective cannot be reached. 
For the next five years, Russia can continue to transit gas through the 
Ukraine route, as the European Commission has helped to broker a deal 
between Ukraine and Russia in December 2019. This route has sufficient 
capacity to compensate for the loss of Nord Stream 2. Russia can thus 
maintain its lucrative business of gas supplies to Europe. 
Germany stopping its support for the project 
could backfire
Targeting the gas sector and exports, in general, would be a more 
effective sanction measure. However, this would have severe 
consequences for the European energy supply. Europe is dependent on 
Russian energy and substituting the Russian supply is not an easy feat, 
as the European Commission has noticed through its promotion of LNG 
terminals and other pipelines. 
Furthermore, following the Crimea annexation in 2014, the EU and the 
US have ‘punished’ Russia through sanctions. Unfortunately, these 
sanctions have yet to have an effect on Russian behaviour. If anything, 
assertive or aggressive Russian acts in other countries seem to have 
increased instead of stopped. Fears for a Russian annexation of Belarus 
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seem realistic, despite EU and US efforts to contain Russia. Therefore, 
Germany rejecting Nord Stream 2 seems unlikely to change Russian 
behaviour. 
Ukrainian soldier digging a trench near a checkpoint in Crimea, 2014. © Flickr / Think 
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In fact, Germany stopping its support for the project could backfire. 
Russia could use this in its propaganda by indicating that Germany uses 
the project to obtain political objectives. Russia’s relations with 
Germany and Europe could deteriorate and the dialogue that Germany 
has tried to maintain with Russia since 2014 could come to an end. It 
could also be framed as Germany ‘giving in’ to US pressure. 
The future of Nord Stream 2
Concluding, the recent calls on Germany to drop its support for the 
project are nothing new. The political and economic costs to keep 
supporting Nord Stream 2 are lower than the costs to drop its support. 
Furthermore, Russian malign actions within and outside of Russia will 
probably not stop by dropping support for the project. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that Merkel will stop supporting the project at this time. 
Despite this, the future of Nord Stream 2 looks bleak, as additional US 
sanctions against the project would make completion of the project 
nearly impossible.
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